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Abstract
In this paper we reconsider the conditions under which the nite-planning-horizon linear-
quadratic dierential game has an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution. Both necessary
and sucient conditions are presented for the existence of a unique solution in terms of
an invertibility condition on a matrix. Moreover, we show that the often encountered
solvability conditions stated in terms of Riccati equations are in general not correct. In
an example we show that existence of a solution of the associated Riccati-type dierential
equations may fail to exist whereas an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution exists.
The scalar case is studied in more detail, and we show that solvability of the associated
Riccati equations is in that case both necessary and sucient.
Furthermore we consider convergence properties of the open-loop Nash equilibrium solu-
tion if the planning horizon is extended to innity. To study this aspect we consider the
existence of real solutions of the associated algebraic Riccati equation in detail and show
how all solutions can be easily calculated from the eigenstructure of a matrix.




A well known problem studied in the literature on dynamic games is the existence of
a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution in the two-player linear quadratic dieren-
tial game dened by (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Basar and
Olsder (1982) or Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986)):






















fx(t)TQ2x(t) + u1(t)TR21u1(t) + u2(t)TR22u2(t)gdt;
in which all matrices are symmetric and, moreover, both Qi and Kif are semi-positive
denite and Rii are positive denite, i = 1; 2.
It is often stated (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Abou-Kandil
and Bertrand (1986) and Abou-Kandil et al. (1993)) that the open-loop Nash equilibrium
solution is given by
u1(t) =  R 111BT1K1(t)(t; 0)x0 (2)
u2(t) =  R 122BT2K2(t)(t; 0)x0 (3)
provided that the set of coupled asymmetric Riccati-type dierential equations
_K1 =  ATK1  K1A Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2; K1(tf) = K1f (4)
_K2 =  ATK2  K2A Q2 +K2S2K2 +K2S1K1; K2(tf) = K2f (5)
has a solution K1(t), K2(t). Here (t; 0) satises the transition equation
_(t; 0) = (A  S1K1   S2K2)(t; 0); (t; t) = I




i ; i = 1; 2:
We will show by means of an example that, stated this way, this assertion is in general not
correct. As correctly stated by Basar and Olsder (1982 theorem 6.5 A-2, or 1995 theorem
6.12) existence of a solution to the above mentioned Riccati dierential equations is just
a sucient condition to conclude that there exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the
game. Unfortunately, Basar and Olsder make an additional assumption in their proof on
the costate variable (that it can be written as the product of a dierentiable matrix and
the state variable), under which, as we will show the existence of a solution of the Riccati
equations is both a necessary and sucient condition for existence of an open-loop Nash
equilibrium. Therefore we present a correct proof of this theorem.
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We will analyze problem (1) from its roots: the corresponding Hamiltonian equations. In
section 2 we show how both necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of a unique
open-loop Nash equilibrium can be derived from these Hamiltonian equations, in terms of
the invertibility of a certain matrixM . In section 3 we give a correct proof of the theorem
stated in Basar and Olsder. Moreover, we present a sucient condition which guarantees
the existence of the set of Riccati dierential equations.
One area where games of this type are widely used is in policy coordination models (see
e.g. van Aarle et al. (1995), Dockner et al. (1985), Fershtman et al. (1987) Hughes
Hallett et al. (1990), Petit (1989)). In many economic policy coordination problems an
interesting problem is to analyse the eect of an expanding planning horizon on the re-
sulting equilibria. Therefore we consider this eect if one expands the planning horizon tf
in (1) to innity in a separate section. One nice property is that the equilibrium solution
becomes much easier to calculate and implement than for a nite planning horizon. Before
we present the results on this subject in section 5, we rst consider the algebraic Riccati
equations associated with (4,5) and their solutions. In section 4 we show how all solutions
of these equations can be determined from the eigenstructure of the matrix M , and that
the eigenvalues of the associated closed-loop system, obtained by applying the state feed-
back control ui (t) =  R 1ii BTi Kix(t) in (1), are completely determined by the eigenvalues
of matrix M . A number of the results presented in sections 4 an 5 are also reported by
Abou-Kandil et al. (1993). The conditions under which they derive the results are however
not always completely specied and their proofs are of a more analytic nature. Therefore
we choose to give here a selfcontained expositure including their results.
Finally, in section 6 we study the scalar case which is of particular interest for many eco-
nomic applications. We show that in the scalar case the above mentioned invertibility
condition is always satised and that as a consequence the equilibrium solution is given
by (2,3) and that this solution converges to a stationary stabilizing feedback policy if the
planning horizon expands.
The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
II. Existence conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium
In this section we consider in detail the existence of a unique open-loop Nash equilib-
rium of the dierential game (1). Due to the stated assumptions both cost functionals
Ji; i = 1; 2, are strictly convex functions of ui for all admissible control functions uj; j 6= i
and for all x0. This implies that the conditions following from the minimum principle are
both necessary and sucient (see e.g. Basar and Olsder (1982, section 6.5)).






2Ri2u2) +  
T
i (Ax+B1u1 +B2u2); i = 1; 2
with respect to ui yields the optimality conditions (see e.g. Basar and Olsder (1982) or
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Abou-Kandil and Bertrand (1986)):
u1(t) =  R 111BT1  1(t) (6)
u2(t) =  R 122BT2  2(t); (7)
where the n-dimensional vectors  1(t) and  2(t) satisfy
_ 1(t) =  Q1x(t) AT 1(t); with  1(tf) = K1fx(tf)
_ 2(t) =  Q2x(t) AT 2(t); with  2(tf) = K2fx(tf)
and
_x(t) = Ax(t)  S1 1(t)  S2 2(t); x(0) = x0:




















with boundary conditions x(0) = x0;  1(tf)   K1fx(tf) = 0 and  2(tf)   K2fx(tf) = 0;
has a unique solution. Denoting the state variable (xT (t)  T1 (t)  
T
2 (t))
T by y(t), we can
rewrite this two-point boundary value problem in the standard form
_y(t) =  My(t); with Py(0) +Qy(tf) = (xT0 0 0)T ; (8)
where M =
0




CA ; P =
0
B@ I 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
1
CA and Q =
0




From (8) we have immediately that problem (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium
if and only if
(P +Qe Mtf )y(0) = (xT0 0 0)
T ;
or equivalently,
(PeMtf +Q)e Mtfy(0) = (xT0 0 0)
T ; (9)
is uniquely solvable for every x0. Elementary matrix analysis then shows that
Theorem 1:
The two-player linear quadratic dierential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilib-
rium for every initial state if and only if the following matrix H(tf) is invertible:
H(tf ) :=W11(tf ) +W12(tf)K1f +W13(tf)K2f ;
with W (tf) = (Wij(tf)) fi; j = 1; 2; 3; Wij 2 Rnng := exp(Mtf ).
Moreover, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution as well as the associated state trajec-
tory can be calculated from the linear two-point boundary value problem (8). 2
5
III. Sucient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium
In this section we consider the usual approach to the problem in terms of the Riccati
equations (4,5) in more detail. First we show that whenever the set of Riccati equations
(4,5) has a solution there exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2:
Problem (1) has a solution if the set of Riccati equations (4,5) has a solution.
Proof:
Let Ki(t) satisfy the set of Riccati equations (4,5). Assume that the feedback control
ui(t) =  R 1ii BTi Ki(t)x(t) is used to control system (1).
Now, dene  i(t) := Ki(t)x(t). Then, obviously _ i(t) = _Ki(t)x(t) +Ki(t) _x(t).
Substitution of _Ki from (4,5) and _x from (1) yields
_ i = ( ATKi  Qi)x =  AT i  Qix:
From this we conclude that the two-point boundary value problem (8) has a solution, which
proves the claim. 2
Now, under the assumption that the open-loop problem has a solution, it follows im-








Since y(t) = e Mty0, it follows that the entries of y(t) can be rewritten as




























H(tf   t)(:=W11(tf   t) +W12(tf   t)K1f +W13(tf   t)K2f )
is invertible for all t 2 [0; tf ], then
 1(t) = K1(t)x(t) and  2(t) = K2(t)x(t)
for some continuously dierentiable matrix functions K1(t) and K2(t), respectively.
Proof:
From (10) we have that x(t) = H(tf   t)H 1(tf)x0:
Since by assumption the matrixH(tf t) is invertible it follows that H 1(tf)x0 = H 1(tf 
t)x(t):
Substitution of this expression into the equations for  i; i = 1; 2, in (11,12) yields:
 1(t) = G1(tf   t)H 1(tf   t)x(t) and (13)
 2(t) = G2(tf   t)H 1(tf   t)x(t) (14)
for some continuously dierentiable matrix functions Gi; i = 1; 2: Since also H
 1(:) is a
continuously dierentiable matrix function the advertised result is obvious now. 2
We like to stress here that the condition as stated in theorem 3 is just a sucient condition
to derive the fact that the adjoint state variables  i; i = 1; 2 can be written as the product
of a dierentiable matrix and the state variable. Given the fact that such a representation
is possible, the next corollary shows that then the open-loop Nash equilibrium can be ob-
tained by solving the set of Riccati dierential equations. This implies in particular (see
the result of theorem 2) that whenever this representation is possible a unique open-loop
Nash equilibrium exists if and only if the set of Riccati dierential equations (4,5) has a
solution.
Corollary 4:
If H(tf   t) is invertible 8t 2 [0; tf ], then the unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution
is given by (2-5).
Proof:
From (6,7) we have that  1(t) and  2(t) satisfy
_ 1(t) =  Q1x(t) AT 1(t); with  1(tf) = K1fx(tf)and
_ 2(t) =  Q2x(t) AT 2(t); with  2(tf) = K2fx(tf)
and
_x(t) = Ax(t)  S1 1(t)  S2 2(t); x(0) = x0:
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According to theorem 3, under the above mentioned invertibility condition,  1(t) and  2(t)
can be factorized as K1(t)x(t) and K2(t)x(t) for some continuous dierentiable matrix func-
tions K1(t) and K2(t), respectively. So, in particular we have that _ i = _Kix+Ki _x; i = 1; 2:
Substitution of _ i and  i; i = 1; 2 into the above formulas yields
( _K1+A
TK1+K1A+Q1 K1S1K1 K1S2K2)eMtx0 = 0 with (K1(tf ) K1f)eMtfx0 = 0; and
( _K2 +A
TK2 +K2A+Q2 K2S2K2  K2S1K1)eMtx0 = 0 with (K2(tf) K2f )eMtfx0 = 0;
for arbitrarily chosen x0.
From this the stated result is obvious. 2
Note that this result in particular implies that under the above mentioned invertibility
condition the existence of a solution to the set of Riccati equations is guaranteed. So
verication of the solvability condition becomes superuous.
The next example shows that there exist situations where the set of Riccati dierential
equations (4,5) does not have a solution, whereas there exists an open-loop Nash equilib-



































































So, according to theorem 1 the problem has no open-loop Nash equilibrium, and therefore
(see theorem 2) the corresponding set of Riccati dierential equations has no solution.
Next consider H(0:11). Numerical calculation shows that with the system parameters as
chosen above, H(0:11) is invertible. So, according to theorem 1 again, the game does have
an open-loop Nash equilibrium for tf = 0:11. However, since the set of Riccati dierential
equations can be rewritten as one autonomous vector dierential equation, whose solutions
are known to be shift invariant, it is clear that the corresponding set of Riccati dierential
equations can not have a solution for tf = 0:11, since it has no solution for tf = 0:1. 2
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IV. The solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation
To study the asymptotic behaviour of the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution of game (1),
in this section we rst consider the set of solutions satisfying the set of so-called algebraic
Riccati equations corresponding with (4,5)
0 =  ATK1  K1A Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2;
0 =  ATK2  K2A Q2 +K2S2K2 +K2S1K1;
)
(ARE)
MacFarlane (1963) and Potter (1966) independently discovered that there exists a relation-
ship between the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation and the eigenvectors
of a related Hamiltonian matrix in linear quadratic regulator problems. We will follow their
approach here and formulate similar results for our problem (1). In fact Abou-Kandil et
al. (1993) already pointed out the existence of a similar relationship. One of their results
is that if the planning horizon tf in (1) tends to innity, under some technical conditions
on the matrixM , the solution of the above mentioned set of Riccati dierential equations
converges to a solution of the set of (ARE) which can be calculated from the eigenspaces
of matrix M.
In this section we elaborate on the relationship between solutions of (ARE) and matrix M
in detail. We present both necessary and sucient conditions in terms of the matrix M
under which (ARE) has (a) real solution(s). In particular we will see that all solutions of
(ARE) can be calculated from the invariant subspaces of M and that the eigenvalues of the
associated closed-loop system, obtained by applying the control ui (t) =  R 1ii BTi Ki(t)x(t),
are completely determined by the eigenvalues of matrix M. As a corollary from these results
we obtain both necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of a stabilizing control
of this type, a result which will be used in the next section.
In our analysis the set of all M -invariant subspaces play a crucial role. Therefore we in-
troduce a separate notation for this set:
Minv := fT jMT  T g.
It is well-known (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985)) that this set contains only
a nite number of (distinct) elements if and only if all eigenvalues of M have a geometric
multiplicity one.
The set of possible solutions for the algebraic Riccati equation can, as will be shown in the
next theorem, directly be calculated from the following collection ofM invariant subspaces:
Kpos :=

K 2MinvjK  Im
0





Note that elements in the set Kpos can be calculated using the set of matrices
Kpos :=











The exact result on how all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated reads as follows:
Theorem 6:
(ARE) has a real solution (K1;K2) if and only if K1 = Y X










Moreover, if the control functions ui (t) =  R 1ii BTi Ki(t)x0 are used to control the system
(1) the spectrum of the matrix  A+ S1K1 + S2K2, coincides with (M jK).
Proof:
























CA ( A+ S1K1 + S2K2):















some matrix J and matrix X invertible, which completes this part of the proof.


















Spelling out the left hand side of this equation gives
0











which immediately yields that J =  A+ S1K1 + S2K2. Substitution of this equality into
the right hand side of the equality shows then that Q1+A
TK1 = K1( A+ S1K1 + S2K2)
and Q2 + A
TK2 = K2( A + S1K1 + S2K2), or stated dierently, K1;K2 satisfy (ARE).
This proves the second part of the theorem.
The last statement of the theorem concerning the spectrum of the matrix A+S1K1+S2K2






CA, matrixM has the block-triangular structure
0
B@
 A+ S1K1 + S2K2 S1 S2
0 AT  K1S1  K1S2
0  K2S1 AT  K2S
which completes the proof. 2
From the above theorem a number of interesting properties concerning the solvability
of (ARE) follow. First of all we observe that every element of Kpos denes exactly one
solution of (ARE). Furthermore, this set contains only a nite number of elements if and
only if the geometric multiplicities of all eigenvalues of M is one. So, in that case we
immediately conclude that (ARE) will have at most a nite number of solutions and that
(ARE) will have no real solution if and only if Kpos is empty.
Another conclusion which immediately follows from the above theorem is that
Corollary 7:
(ARE) will have a set of solutions (K1;K2) stabilizing the closed-loop system matrix
A   S1K1   S2K2 if and only if there exists an M invariant subspace K in Kpos such
that Re  > 0 for all  2 (M jK). 2
To illustrate some of the above mentioned properties, reconsider example 5.
Example 5 (continued):
Numerical calculations show that the eigenvalues of M are f 42:1181; 0:8866; 0:3441
4:6285i; 0:3168; 42:1096g, and the corresponding eigenspaces
T1 = Spanf ( 0:9968 0:0549 0:0471 0:0229 0:0242   0:0013)T g;
T2 = Spanf ( 0:0178 0:0108   0:2191   0:5272   0:1570 0:8056)T g;
T3 = Spanf ( 0:0439 0:1636   0:085   0:1382 0:0519   0:1906)T ;
(0:2512   0:9146   0:0284   0:0425 0:0168   0:0582)T g;
T4 = Spanf (0:1145   0:4047   0:2570   0:4975 0:1676   0:6939)T g and
T5 = Spanf ( 0:9970 0:0545   0:0450   0:0219   0:0231 0:0013)T g:




+1 = 7 real solutions. Furthermore, there is no solution which stabilizes the closed-
loop system matrix.
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CA := (T1 T2): This yields the solution





















The eigenvalues of the closed-loop system (1) using the control ui(t) =  R 1ii BTi Kix(t)
are f42:1181; 0:8866g: It is easily veried that the rank of the rst two rows of every other
candidate solution is also two, so we conclude that (ARE) has seven solutions, none of
which is stabilizing. 2
V. Convergence results
As argued in the introduction, it is interesting to see how the open-loop equilibrium solution
changes when the planning horizon tf tends to innity. To study convergence properties for
problem (1), it seems reasonable to require that problem (1) has a properly dened solu-
tion for every nite planning horizon. Therefore in this section we will make the following
well-posedness assumption (see theorem 1)
H(tf) is invertible for all tf <1: (15)
Furthermore, we will see that general convergence results can only be derived if the eigen-
structure of matrix M satises an additional property, which we dene rst.
Denition 8:
M is called dichotomically separable if there exist subspaces V1 and V2 such that MVi 
Vi; i = 1; 2; V1  V2 = IR3n; where dimV1 = n; dimV2 = 2n; and moreover Re  >
Re  for all  2 (M jV1);  2 (M jV2): 2
Using corollary 4 we have now immediately from (15) that to study the convergence of
the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution we can restrict ourselves to the study of the set of
Riccati dierential equations (4-5) at time 0. We will denote the corresponding solutions
of (4-5) by Ki(0; tf), respectively. So the question is under which conditions the solutions
of this set of equations will converge if tf increases. Note that Ki(0; tf) can be viewed as
the solution k(t) of an autonomous vector dierential equation _k = f(k), with k(0) = k0
for some xed k0, and where f is a smooth function. Elementary analysis shows then that
Ki(0; tf) converges to a limit k only if this limit k satises f(k) = 0. Therefore, we imme-
diately deduce from theorem 6 the following necessary condition for convergence.
Lemma 9:
Ki(0; tf) can only converge to a limit Ki(0) if the set Kpos is nonempty. 2
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Note that dichotomic separability of M implies that Kpos is nonempty. On the other
hand it is not dicult to construct an example where Kpos is nonempty, whereas M is not
dichotomically separable.
To study the convergence of Ki(0; tf ) we reconsider (13) and (14) in theorem 3. From these
formulas we have that








































We are now able to give an elementary proof of the following result (see also Abou-Kandil
et al (1993, section 4))
Theorem 10:
Assume that the well-posedness assumption (15) holds.





CA V2 = IR3n;
K1(0; tf)! Y0X 10 ; and K2(0; tf)! Z0X 10 ;






















CA V2 = IR3n;

























and (Ji) = (M jVi), i = 1; 2.
Using this, we can rewrite K1(0; tf ) and K2(0; tf) in (16,17) as ~Gi(tf) ~H
 1(tf), i = 1; 2,
where






































Here n is the element of (M jV1) which has the smallest real part.
Next, consider ~G1(tf)  Y0X 10 ~H(tf).
Simple calculations show that this matrix can be rewritten as































As e ntfeJ2tf converges to zero for tf !1, it is obvious now that ~G1(tf)  Y0X 10 ~H(tf )
converges to zero for tf ! 1. Similarly it can be shown that also ~G2(tf )   Z0X 10 ~H(tf )
converges to zero for tf ! 1. To conclude from this that K1(0; tf) ! Y0X 10 , and
K2(0; tf ) ! Z0X 10 , it suces to show that ~H 1(tf) remains bounded for tf ! 1. This





Combination of the results from theorem 10 and corollary 7 yields then
Corollary 11:
If the planning horizon tf in the dierential game (1) tends to innity, the unique open-loop
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Nash equilibriumsolution converges to a stationary feedback strategy ui (t) =  R 1ii BTi Kix(t); i =
1; 2, which stabilizes the associated closed-loop system, if the following conditions are sat-
ised:
1. all conditions mentioned in theorem 10
2. Re  > 0;8 2 (M jV1):
Moreover, these constant feedback matrices can be calculated from the eigenspaces of ma-
trix M (see theorem 10). 2
VI. The scalar case
We start this section by showing that the invertibility condition mentioned in corollary
3 is always satised if the dimensions of both the state and the input variables in system
(1) equal one. This implies that for this kind of systems the usually stated assertion that
the open-loop Nash strategy is given by (2-5) is correct and, moreover, that the associated
Riccati equations yield the appropriate solution. To prove this result we rst calculate the
exponential of matrix M . To stress the fact that in this section we are dealing with the
scalar case, we will put the system parameters in lower case, so e.g. a instead of A.
Lemma 12:























B@ (s1q1 + s2q2) s1(a  ) s2(a  )0  2q2 2q1
 (s1q1 + s2q2)  s1(a+ )  s2(a+ )
1
CA ;
with the determinant of V , detV = 2(s1q1 + s2q2); and  =
p
a2 + s1q1 + s2q2.
Proof:
Straightforward multiplication shows that we can factorizeM asM = V diag(a; ; )V  1.
So (see e.g. Lancaster et al (1985, theorem 9.4.3)), the exponential of matrix M , eMs, is
as stated above. 2
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Next consider the matrix H(s) from theorem 3 for an arbitrarily chosen s 2 [0; tf ]. Obvi-












[(s1q1+ s2q2)f( a)es+(a+)e sg+(2 a2)(es  e s)(s1k1f + s2k2f)]:
Clearly, H(s) is positive for every s  0. This implies in particular that H(s) diers from
zero for every s 2 [0; tf ], whatever tf > 0 is. So from corollary 4 we now immediately have
the following conclusion.
Theorem 13:









where k1(t) and k2(t) are the solutions of the coupled asymmetric Riccati-type dierential
equations
_k1 =  ak1   k1a  q1 + k21s1 + k1s2k2; k1(tf) = k1f




b2i ; i = 1; 2: 2
We conclude this section by considering the convergence properties of the open-loop equi-
librium solution mentioned above. It turns out that in the scalar case we can prove that
this solution always converges.
Theorem 14:
Assume that s1q1 + s2q2 > 0:

















Moreover, these strategies stabilize the closed-loop system (1).
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Proof:
Since s1q1 + s2q2 > 0; it is clear from (19) that M is dichotomic separable. Furthermore
we showed above that the well-posedness assumption is always satised in the scalar case.
Note that  > 0, so according to corollary 11 the open-loop Nash strategies converge to
a stationary feedback strategy whenever kif ; i = 1; 2; are such that s1q1 + s2q2 + s1(a  
)k1f + s2(a  )k2f 6= 0.
Now consider the case that s1q1 + s2q2 + s1(a   )k1f + s2(a   )k2f = 0: To study this
case, reconsider (16) and (17) for tf ! 1. Elementary spelling out of these formulas,
using (19), shows that also in this case both k1(0; tf) and k2(0; tf) converge to the limits
as advertised above, which concludes the proof. 2
VII. Concluding remarks
In this paper we reconsidered the existence and asymptotic behaviour of a unique open-
loop Nash equilibrium solution in the two-player linear quadratic game. We analyzed the
problem starting from its basics: the Hamiltonian equations. We derived necessary and
sucient conditions for the existence of a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution in
terms of a full rank condition on a modied fundamental matrix. An open problem remains
to nd general conditions on the system matrices which guarantee that the rank condition
is satised. Furthermore we showed by means of an example that in general a solution to
the set of associated dierential Riccati equations may fail to exist whereas an open-loop
Nash equilibrium solution exists. A sucient condition is given under which the open-loop
equilibrium solution can be obtained via the solutions of these Riccati dierential equa-
tions. Again, an open problem remains to interpret this solvability condition in terms of
the system matrices.
To study convergence of the open-loop equilibrium solution if the planning horizon is ex-
tended to innity, we argued that for well-posedness reasons we can restrict ourselves to
study the asymptotic behavior of the Riccati dierential equations. To that end we rst
considered the existence of real solutions for the corresponding algebraic Riccati equations.
We showed how every real solution to (ARE) can be calculated from the invariant sub-
spaces of the matrixM =
0




CA. Furthermore, we showed how the eigenvalues
of the system if the corresponding feedback control strategies are used in (1) correspond
to the eigenvalues of this matrix.
In particular this approach makes it possible to conclude whether (ARE) has a real so-
lution, and if so, how many solutions there are (there are always only a nite number of
solutions if the geometric multiplicity of all eigenvalues of M is one) and which of them
gives rise to control strategies that stabilize the closed-loop system. We noted that in
general (ARE) will have more than one stabilizing solution. We like to note that it is not
dicult to show by means of an example that this property is independent of the fact
whether matrixM is dichotomically separable or not.
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These results raise a number of interesting open questions, namely, is it possible to say a
priori something on the relationship between the eigenstructure of matrixM (in particular
the structure which guarantees the existence of stabilizing solutions to (ARE), and more
in particular the structure which generically implies convergence of the solutions of the
Riccati dierential equations) and geometric properties of the system parameters in (1). A
rst attempt to answer the question under which conditions on the system matrices there
may exist a stabilizing solution was addressed in Engwerda and Weeren (1994), where for
a number of particular situations it was shown that matrixM always has at least n eigen-
values (counted with their algebraic multiplicities) with a positive real part. On the other
hand, by means of an example it was shown there that this property does not always hold.
The results on the existence of real solutions to (ARE) were used to show that if the
dimension of the direct sum of the invariant subspaces corresponding with the n largest
eigenvalues (counted again with algebraic multiplicities) equals n, then generically the so-
lution to the Riccati dierential equations converges to a solution which can be directly
calculated from this direct sum.
Since there are a number of applications which just involve scalar systems we concluded
the paper by a detailed analysis of that case. We showed that for those systems, the unique
open-loop Nash equilibrium solution can always be found by solving the associated set of
Riccati dierential equations, and that this solution converges to a stationary state feed-
back strategy, which stabilizes the associated closed-loop system if the planning horizon
tends to innity.
Finally we note that the obtained results can be straightforwardly generalized to the N
player game.
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